



1 November 2018
Busan Port International Passenger Terminal

# **Korean Container Shipping Market Forecasts**



## Déjà vu - has anything changed in the last 40 years?

# A watershed year

will prove to be a There seems little doubt that the year crucial one for the container liner shipping industry and thus the box business at large, as the crisis of overcapacity which has slowly been gaining momentum on most of the world's key container trades over the past few years comes to a head. Difficult and uncomfortable decisions will have to be made as some of the most prestigious companies in the liner shipping industry struggle to stay affoat. And, although it will not necessarily be a case of the 'survival of the fittest', since many governments and other institutions will continue to prop up some of the less healthy carriers, it seems certain that the next 12 months will mark a turning point in the strategies, operations and corporate structures of many container shipping companies. This sense of destiny will be heightened by the fact that at the same time these operators will also have to come to terms with a changing regulatory order which will formally alter the time-honoured rules under which the liner industry has been conducted in many markets.

#### **Recurring themes:**

- Overcapacity
- Shipping companies struggle to stay afloat
- Governments continue to support struggling lines
- Changing regulatory regimes
  - 2020 Sulphur Cap
  - Ballast Water Management

#### True innovations remain elusive in container shipping



# Dan Ariely

7 January 2013 · 🐊



Big data is like teenage sex: everyone talks about it, nobody really knows how to do it, everyone thinks everyone else is doing it, so everyone claims they are doing it...

Replace 'Big Data' with any of the latest innovation buzzwords in container shipping:-

- **Digitization**
- **Blockchain**
- **Artificial Intelligence (AI)**
- **Predictive analytics**
- **Machine learning**

Technology and innovations have so far failed to transform the shipping industry



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
#### **Industry consolidation – Last 10 years**

From 2008 To 2018

#### **Capacity Operated in TEU Millions (End 2008)**



#### Capacity Operated in TEU Millions (Nov 2018)




#### What has changed?

- 'Global' carriers down from 22 to 12
- Scale of operations have increased by
  - 2.0 X (Maersk)
  - 2.2 X (MSC)
  - 2.7 X (CMA CGM)
  - 3.2 X (Hapag-Lloyd)
  - 5.7 X (COSCO)



#### **Korean consolidation – no progress made**




#### What has changed?

- Fragmented market unchanged (11 carriers remain SM Line replaced Hanjin Shg/Pan Ocean replaced STX Pan Ocean). Only one carrier exited Dongnama (C& Line) in 2008.
- Total capacity operated by Korean carriers increased by 7.6% between 2008 and 2018
- But global capacity increased by 78.8% in the same period
- Korean carriers share have fallen behind global average by factor of 10 X



#### **Korean Shipping Lines' Global Capacity Share**

Global capacity share has dropped from 6.5% to 3.5%



#### No simple fixes to complex problems

- Korea's 100 Policy Tasks (Five-year Plan of the Moon Jae-In Administration)
  - Task 80: To make the nation a maritime power through the joint development of the shipping and shipbuilding industries

Korean's five-year plan for the shipping industry is based on three major initiatives:

- 1. securing stable cargo bookings based on competitive services and freight,
- 2. constructing energy-efficient ships that operate at low costs, and
- 3. promoting stable management through continuous innovation.

But none of these initiatives address the fundamental problems that carriers face:


- Market fragmentation and excessive competition amongst Korean carriers
- Low operating margins
- Weak balance sheet and uncompetitive cost structure especially HMM
- Over-supply of global containership fleet

When will Korean government support for shipping industry end?

## **HMM** growth roadmap


- HMM capacity operated is expected to reach 940,000 teu in 2021 from 415,000 teu
- 2020 environmental regulations described as "golden opportunity for HMM's resurgence" – but rapid expansion carries significant risks






## Korean carriers have consistently under-performed

- HMM operating margins the lowest amongst all main carriers since 2016
- Current HMM structure is set up to fail
- Future roadmap for HMM still unclear
  - 2M/HMM an unequal partnership
  - New alliance partnership after
     2020 still to be confirmed
  - 2018 cost saving initiatives have not achieved desired results
- A complete restructuring of HMM is required – recapitalisation and removal of toxic assets together with onerous contracts




#### **Lessons learnt from past bankruptcies**

- 4 of the 10 largest bankruptcies in container shipping involved Korean companies
  - Financially overstretched
  - Over-expansion



## **Korea Shipping Partnership failed to address key challenges**


- 14 carriers (or 12 carriers if affiliated carriers are excluded)
- Only 3 limited rounds of service rationalisations, all in the intra-Asia routes
  - Nov 2017 (Busan-Hakata/Moji service)
  - Jan 2018 (Korea-Thailand & Korea-Indonesia)
  - Mar 2018 (Korea-North Vietnam)





#### **Korean Intra-Asia carriers remains highly fragmented**


• 7 of the Top 25 carriers in Intra-Asia (Far East) trades are Korean but none have the scale to dominate the market



| Country     |           | No. of carriers<br>(Top 25) |
|-------------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| S. Korea    |           | 7                           |
| China       |           | 5                           |
| Taiwan      |           | 5                           |
| Denmark     | <b>(</b>  | 1                           |
| France      |           | 1                           |
| Japan       |           | 1                           |
| Switzerland |           | 1                           |
| Thailand    |           | 1                           |
| Singapore   | <b>©:</b> | 1                           |
| Indonesia   |           | 1                           |
| Russia      |           | 1                           |

#### Sinokor & Heung-A merger insufficient

• The combined intra-Asia capacity of Sinokor & Heung-A is still insufficient to give it a strong position in the market



Japanese ONE model for the Sinokor/Heung-A merger is flawed

- Overly long window (20 months) for integration of business
- Uncertainty remains on financial health
- Lack of clear leadership in merger process
- Mismatch of strengths and route overlaps
- Limited synergy savings

#### But consolidation in itself will not deliver dividends

 Predictions that consolidation will bring about market stability have proved to be premature



Consolidation will bring stability to liner shipping industry, says Maersk China boss



"Increasing liner concentration give carriers much more control over market and an end to era of low freight rates ...

"The demise of Hanjin has changed the commercial landscape and the pricing discipline of the carriers"


Market concentration correlates with industry profitability ...



October 2017

## **Competition will continue to curb carriers' earnings**

Average operating margins of container carriers (2008-2018) was -2.1%




Average of CMA CGM (incl APL to 2Q 2016), CSCL (to 1Q2016), EMC, Hanjin (to 3Q 2016), Hapag-Lloyd (incl CSAV to 2014), HMM, Maersk, ONE (from 2Q 2018, formerly KL, MOL, NYK), WHL, YML, Zim



### 2019 will remain challenging with supply overhang to persist


 Supply-Demand imbalance not expected to be cleared, with idle capacity of >750,000 teu expected to be carried over to 2019





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### Carriers still chasing market share - Top 12 carriers **16.5%**





| No. | Operator      | %     |
|-----|---------------|-------|
| 1   | APM-Maersk    | 13.9% |
| 2   | MSC           | 5.2%  |
| 3   | COSCO Group   | 56.3% |
| 4   | CMA CGM Group | 6.8%  |
| 5   | Hapag-Lloyd   | 5.3%  |
| 6   | ONE           | 9.2%  |
| 7   | Evergreen     | 10.8% |
| 8   | Yang Ming     | 10.8% |
| 9   | PIL           | 14.0% |
| 10  | Hyundai M.M.  | 10.5% |
| 11  | Zim           | 16.7% |
| 12  | Wan Hai       | 15.0% |


Average growth 6.5% (Sep 2018 vs Sep 2017) after adjustment for OOCL and Hamburg Sud capacity prior to their acquisition by COSCO and Maersk




### **Top 4 carriers – different approaches to growth (last 12 months)**












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#### **COSCO - most aggressive growth**



#### **End**

#### Please send any queries to hjtan@liner-research.com

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